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A Theory of Pleading, Litigation, and Settlement
William H.J. Hubbard†
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal are the most
important cases on pleading in fifty years. A large literature argues
that these cases have raised pleading standards, empowered federal
judges as the gatekeepers to federal court, and undermined the “liberal
ethos” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This understanding of
pleading doctrine has in turn led to predictions of dramatic effects on
dismissal rates, particularly for claims, such as employment discrimination claims, where plaintiffs often lack knowledge of the defendant’s
intent at the outset of the case. The accumulating empirical evidence,
however, confounds these predictions. Why have the most significant
pleading cases in 50 years had virtually no statistically significant effects? Why, in an era of heightened pleading, do defendants file motions to dismiss in only 6 percent of cases? Why have employment discrimination cases been largely unaffected by Twombly and Iqbal? To
explain these puzzles, I develop a new theory of pleading, in which
pleading practices are not driven by pleading rules and doctrine, but
by litigation strategy, and in particular the use of detailed pleadings
to precipitate early settlement. I argue that even in a world with no
motions to dismiss, we should expect detailed, plausible pleadings to
be the norm. I conclude by arguing that Twombly and Iqbal advance
rather than weaken the “liberal ethos” of the Federal Rules. Viewed in
this light, Twombly and Iqbal point us to a crucial margin on which
they may—or may not—have had a hard-to-detect but potentially important effect: with respect to a small, but disproportionately expensive, set of cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Scholars today describe the pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as making judges the gatekeepers to the federal courts. 1 Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff’s complaint contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” As originally envisioned by the drafters of the Federal
Rules, and as affirmed in the seminal case Conley v. Gibson, 2 the
gatekeeping function of federal judges was minimal: “notice pleading,”
which required only that the pleading give the defendant notice of the
plaintiff’s grievance. Notice pleading reflected a deliberate break with
prior pleading regimes, whose cumbersome requirements were seen as
traps for the unwary. 3 Rather than having courts decide cases based
on the niceties of pleading, the “liberal ethos” of the Federal Rules required only the barest of allegations, so that cases could be decided “on
the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery.” 4 A
line from Conley became the mantra for the liberality of this approach:
Benjamin P. Cooper, Iqbal’s Retro Revolution, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 937
(2011) (“Pleading is often described as the ‘gatekeeper for civil litigation.’”)
(quoting Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 821, 824 (2010); Rory K. Schneider, Comment, Illiberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings, 159 PA. L. REV. 585, 586
(2011) (noting that “pleading is the gateway by which litigants access federal
courts”).
2 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
3 See, e.g., Statement of Edgar Tolman, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON
FEDERAL RULES (1938), reprinted in RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 301 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) (“It
was impossible for the ordinary practitioner to know all the pitfalls that were
lying in wait as traps for the unaccustomed practitioner.”).
4Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986). The story of regime of
“fact pleading” that preceded the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the development of simplified pleading systems, including the
Field Code in the 19th Century, which culminated in the adoption of the
Rules in 1938 may be of interest to the reader. For an account, see, e.g., id. at
433–44; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573–76 (2007), (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L.
REV 90, 109–14 (2009); Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage
Complaint Pleading as a Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1191, 1196–218 (2010); Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences
in Pleading Standards, 158 PA. L. REV 441, 447–52 (2010) [hereinafter Dodson, Pleading Standards].
1
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“a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 5
So when Bell Alantic Corp. v. Twombly 6 “retired” the “no set of
facts” language from Conley, the result was “shockwaves through the
legal community—for academics, practitioners, and judges alike.” 7
Twombly instantly became a fixture in judicial opinions, 8 and after 50
years of near-dormancy, the scholarly literature on pleading exploded. 9 The academic reaction to Twombly reflected a sense of concern—
even alarm—at an apparent revolution in pleading and court practice. 10
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46.
Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
7 Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1305 (2010)
(citations omitted). See also Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2009) (“No decision in recent memory has generated
as much interest and is of such potentially sweeping scope as the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.”); Patricia W. Hatamyar,
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U.
L. REV. 553, 554 (2010) (characterizations Twombly as “[s]eemingly without
warning”); Richard A. Epstein, Twobly, After Two Years: The Procedural Revolution in Antitrust That Wasn’t, GCP: THE ONLINE MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL
COMPETITION POLICY, July 2009 at 4 (calling Twombly “out of the blue”); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B. C. L. REV 431, 431 (2008)
[hereinafter Spencer, Plausibility] (“a startling move by the U.S. Supreme
Court”); Smith, supra note 7, at 1063 (“a surprising departure from ingrained
federal pleading rules”)
8 Twombly has been cited in judicial opinions tens of thousands of times and
is already one of the most cited decisions in the history of the United States.
See Steinman, supra note 7, at 1295 (noting that “[a]s of March 2010,
Twombly had been cited in nearly 24,000 federal decisions—already number
seven of all time.”); Ettie Ward, The Aftershocks of Twombly: Will We “Notice”
Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 893 (2008) (noting that “Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on May
21, 2007, and has already been cited more than 9,400 times as of March 15,
2008.”).
9 See Stancil, supra note 4, at 137–38 (writing “Until recently, the scholarly
literature on pleading standards was remarkably thin, with only a few significant pieces written from the 1930s through the early 2000s. Widespread
scholarly interest in pleading is a remarkably recent phenomenon, tracing its
birth to the Supreme Court’s 2007 opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.”) I cannot begin to survey the literature on Twombly. For a litany
of citations, see Steinman, supra note 7, at 1296–98 & nn.10–14.
10 See, e.g., Schneirder, supra note 1, at 527 (“a revolution in pleading”); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doc5
6
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Two years later, Ashcroft v. Iqbal 11 elaborated on Twombly and reiterated the rule that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” 12 With Iqbal, the controversy
over pleading standards intensified. Bills to overturn Twombly and
Iqbal were introduced in both the House and Senate, 13 and practicing
attorneys and law professors testified before Congress that Twombly
has had a “devastating impact” on many types of cases, and particularly civil rights cases, in federal court, 14 and that “Twombly and Iqbal
have brought about sweeping changes in the lower courts, all for the
worse.” 15 While a few scholars argued that plausibility pleading represented a modest doctrinal shift, 16 a near-consensus quickly emerged

trinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.
U. L. REV 1217, 1235 (2008) (“a sea of change”); Rebecca M. Hamburg & Matthew C. Koski, Summary of Results of Federal Judicial Center Survey of
NELA
Members,
Fall
2009,
10
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/
Library/NELA,%20Summary%20of%20Results%20of%20FJC%20Survey%20
of%20NELA%20Members.pdf (a “drastic departure from well-established
pleading standards”); Steinman, supra note 7, at 1310 (“a new era”); Arthur
R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L. J. 1, 28 (2010) (a “radical departure from
prior practice”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive
Proceedings, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, (2010) [hereinafter Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide] (a “subversion[ ] of law to achieve the restrictive ends of
societal elites”). See also Stancil, supra note 4, at 114 (Two years after
Twombly, noting that “the furor regarding Twombly continues to rage.”); Epstein, supra note 7 at 2 (“Without question, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly[ ] ranks
as one of the most controversial decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in recent years.”). Twombly continues to generate headlines in the legal press. See generally, e.g., Leslie A. Gordon, For Federal Plaintiffs,
Twombly and Iqbal Still Present a Catch 22, ABA JOURNAL, January 1, 2011
available at http://www.abajournal.com.).
11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
12 Id. at 679.
13 See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009);
Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
14 Schneider, supra note 1, at 531. See also Davis (2009); Rubin (2009).
15 Hearings on Limitations on Complaint Dismissals: Hearing on H. 4115 Before Subcomm. On Courts and Competition Policy of the H, Comm. On the
Judiciary, 111 Cong. (2009) (statement of Eric Schnapper, Professor, University of Washington School of Law), [hereinafter Statement of Eric Schnapper].
16 See generally, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009) [hereinafter Bone, Pleading Rules]; Epstein, supra note 7; Steinman, supra note 7 (all arguing that
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“among academic observers that the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard
marks a sharp break with the past.” 17
Particular concern arose for civil rights plaintiffs, and especially
employment discrimination plaintiffs, who often lack direct evidence
of the defendant’s motives at the outset of litigation. 18 “The
Twombly/Iqbal requirement that a complaint allege facts showing that
the plaintiff’s claim is plausible is a requirement that—prior to filing
suit (and before obtaining discovery)—the plaintiff must already have
evidence sufficient to meet the new ‘plausibility’ standard. In discrimination cases this will often be an insurmountable barrier.” 19 In this
way, the argument goes, Twombly and Iqbal create the “Paradox of
Pleading”: “civil rights plaintiffs . . . cannot state a claim because they
do not have access to documents or witnesses they believe exist; and
they cannot get access to those documents or witnesses without stating a claim.” 20
Viewed from the perspective of pleading doctrine, in which the
baseline is liberal notice pleading and judges are the gatekeepers to
court, the furor over Twombly and Iqbal is justified: these cases impose new, heightened standards by which many civil claimants will be
denied access to courts. Federal judges are now more active gatekeepers. “Notice pleading” has become “plausibility pleading.” The “liberal
ethos” has become a “restrictive ethos,” which eschews discovery and
trial for dispositions at the pleading stage. 21 Bone summarized this
view:
Twombly and Iqbal did not represent a sharp break in precedent or was only
a modest change in doctrine).
17 Alexander A.Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND L. J. 119,
122 (2011).
18 See Reinert, supra note 12, at 123.
19 Statement of Eric Schnapper, supra note 17). See also Hearings on Limitations on Complaint Dismissals: Hearing on H. 4115 Before Subcomm. On
Courts and Competition Policy of the H, Comm. On the Judiciary, 111 Cong.
(2009) (statement of Jonathan L. Rubin, Lawyer, Patton Boggs LLP); Hatamyar, supra note 7, at 602 n. 259; Reinert, supra note 12, at 122 (“Particular
attention has been paid to the impact of the Iqbal and Twombly rules on civil
rights litigation, where informational asymmetry is often at its highest point,
but where federal courts and federal law have played an important historical
role.”). Justice Stevens made a similar argument for antitrust cases in his
Twombly dissent. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 586–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20 Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and
the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 927 (2010).
21See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010) [hereinafter Spencer, Restrictive
Ethos].
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Many judges and academic commentators read [Twombly] as
overturning fifty years of generous notice pleading practice,
and critics attack it as a sharp departure from the “liberal
ethos” of the Federal Rules, favoring decisions “on the merits,
by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery.” 22
Benjamin Spencer put it more pithily: “Notice pleading is dead.” 23
These views are widely held, and together they reflect a coherent
theory of pleading in civil litigation: pleading doctrine, whether notice
pleading or plausibility pleading, drives litigation outcomes by setting
the standards by which judges exercise their gatekeeping function. In
federal court, this view implies that Twombly and Iqbal are watershed
cases, and federal judges should now be turning away larger numbers
of cases—especially employment discrimination cases—at the courthouse door.
But this theory, however compelling, requires reexamination. A
number of scholars have wisely cautioned that the effect of Twombly
and Iqbal is ultimately an empirical question, and careful observation
would be necessary to inform our understanding of pleading. 24 We now
have the benefit of a large body of empirical work inspired by the
scholarship on Twombly and Iqbal. Many of the empirical findings in
this scholarship, however, contradict rather than confirm our expectations about pleading practice:
Every study of the rates at which motion to dismiss are granted
(with prejudice) has found no statistically significant change in
grant rates after either Twombly or Iqbal, even for employment
discrimination cases. 25
The best estimates of the total number of cases affected by
Twombly and Iqbal—assuming that they have had any effect at
all—place that number at perhaps 1 percent of all cases, even
for employment discrimination cases. 26
Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 11, at 875 (quoting Marcus, supra note 4,
at 439.
23 Spencer, Plausibility, supra note 7, at 431. See also Cooper, supra note 1, at
960 (stating that “liberal notice pleading appears dead”).
24 See Hoffman, supra note 10, at 1222 (“The Court’s recent decisions, and
Twombly in particular, may or may not mark a fundamental change in where
courts strike the balance between access and efficiency. It is still too early to
say.”); Miller, supra note 10, at 2 (“Much fine-grained empirical research is
needed to separate fact from fiction.”).
25 See infra at nn. 37–40 and accompanying text.
26 See infra at nn 49–51 and accompanying text.
22

2-Nov-13]

A Theory of Pleading

7

Even after Iqbal, motions to dismiss (for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted) are filed in only 6 percent of
cases. 27
In other words, neither the predicted seismic shift in pleading
practice nor the predicted differential impact on employment discrimination cases has transpired. And the third empirical finding bears
further elaboration. Its significance is not only that motions to dismiss
have been rare after Twombly and Iqbal, but that motions to dismiss
have always been rare. This might have been expected in the post1938 world of liberal notice pleading, but what about in the pre-Rules
world of strict fact pleading? What of the demurrer, the common law
ancestor of the motion to dismiss? Here is what Charles Clark, the architect of liberal notice pleading, said in 1938:
I have had some experience in studying the statistics of trial
courts, and very rarely indeed does a final action come on a
demurrer—very, very rarely. The percentage is almost infinitesimal. Actually demurrers cut a very small figure in any general picture of the court’s business. 28
In short, the empirical picture under plausibility pleading, under notice pleading, and even under pre-Rules common law and Code pleading looks surprisingly similar.
Like the Ptolemaic model of cosmology, the prevailing theory of
federal pleading struggles to account for the observed data. It is time
to revisit the foundational assumptions of the incumbent theory:
What if federal judges are not the gatekeepers to civil litigation
in the federal courts?
What if, in practice, the gatekeeping standard has nothing to
do with Rule 8, Conley, Twombly, or Iqbal?
What if, in all but a small fraction of cases, neither “notice
pleading” nor “plausibility pleading” affects how the pleadings
are written, let alone whether the complaint is dismissed?
And what if, in that fraction of cases where pleading standards
might matter, it is plausibility pleading, and not notice pleading, that better reflects the “liberal ethos” of the Federal Rules?
See infra at nn. 34–36 and accompanying text.
Statement of Charles E. Clark, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES (1938),reprinted in RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 239 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938) [hereinafter Statement of Charles E. Clark].
27
28
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In the course of this article, I begin to develop a theory of pleading
that accounts for both the doctrine and the data on pleading.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II makes
the case for the central empirical result that a theory of pleading must
explain: the minimal effect of Twombly and Iqbal on dismissal rates in
the federal court, including among employment discrimination cases.
The primary evidence upon which I rely is quantitative empirical
studies of court data, a literature to which I have contributed in earlier work. But further evidence emerges from surveys of practitioners, a
comparative view of pleading practice across U.S. jurisdictions, and
from the opinions of courts themselves. This thoroughly consistent
body of evidence, I argue, indicates that the modest impact of
Twombly and Iqbal is a real phenomenon that requires explanation.
In Part III, I undertake to explain this central fact through a novel
thought experiment: What if there were no pleading standard at all,
such that no complaints could ever be dismissed for failure to state a
claim? By approaching pleading in this way, we no longer see the universe of pleading as revolving around judicial decisions on motions to
dismiss. Rather, pleading is simply one distinctive component of litigation practice, all of which revolves around the endgame of modern
civil litigation: settlement.
I argue that in this hypothetical pleading regime, rational, strategic plaintiffs will still have the incentive to file factually detailed complaints (or not to file at all). If so, we begin to see why a plausibility
pleading standard might have little effect. It is redundant with what
plaintiffs would do regardless.
The argument is straightforward. Litigation is expensive, and this
has two key consequences for civil practice. First, both plaintiffs and
defendants prefer to settle rather than litigate. Second, a plaintiff will
not bother to file suit if she doesn’t stand a good chance of winning.
Because of this, defendants are willing to settle with plaintiffs whose
cases are strong enough to justify a lawsuit, but defendants would prefer to refuse to settle with plaintiffs whose claims are weak; such
plaintiffs will abandon their claims if they cannot obtain a settlement
without suing.
If defendants cannot perfectly discern plaintiffs with serious
claims from others, plaintiffs with strong claims need a way to credibly signal the strength of their case. As I argue, civil procedure provides just such a mechanism: pleading. And it is through factually detailed pleading that a plaintiff communicates the strength of her case,
and thereby facilitates settlement. Under this view, the contents of
pleadings in federal practice are not driven by the prospect of a motion
to dismiss, but by the impetus to settle. Judges serve a minimal gate-
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keeping function because plaintiffs and their lawyers are the primary
gatekeepers to the courts, and the gatekeeping function is driven not
by pleading standards, but by the costs of litigation and the generosity
of potential legal relief. 29
In Part IV, I return to the empirical data and show that the theory
of pleading presented in this article accounts for the observed patterns
of behavior, including the remarkable constancy of dismissal rates before and after Twombly and Iqbal and the fact that even after Iqbal,
motions to dismiss are filed in only 6 percent of cases. This analysis
also shows that the catch-22 scenario described by the paradox of
pleading will rarely arise in actual practice. Because plaintiffs and
their attorneys carefully screen cases for merit based on the facts
available to the plaintiff before filing suit, claims that cannot be
pleaded in detail are not filed, even under a pleading regime in which
no complaint is dismissed. The paradox of pleading assumes a plaintiff
files a complaint, but cannot articulate why the claim stands a chance
of winning; yet even before Twombly, no plaintiffs’ attorney would
take such a case.
Part V concludes, proposing that plausibility pleading embraces,
rather than rejects, the “liberal ethos” of the Federal Rules—by promoting the ends of the liberal ethos in an era in which litigation strategy is not dominated by pleadings and trial, but revolves around settlement.
II. SEMINAL CASES, MINIMAL EFFECTS
I devote this Part to establishing the key empirical findings that a
theory of pleading must explain. While there is little doubt that
Twombly and Iqbal stand as landmarks in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on civil pleading, studies of court data, surveys of practitioners, and state court practice consistently reveal evidence casting doubt
on any claim that Twombly and Iqbal would have a substantial effect
on dismissals of federal civil cases. 30
That plaintiffs’ attorneys are the gatekeepers to the civil justice system has
long been recognized. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency fee lawyers as
gatekeepers in the civil justice system, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 22 (1997) (“Lawyers, particularly contingency fee lawyers, are gatekeepers who control the
flow of civil cases into the courts.”). The relevance of this fact to pleading
practice, however, has received scant attention.
30 Note that this evidence addresses on the purported shift from notice to
plausibility pleading. It does not address super-heightened forms of pleading,
such as required by Federal Rule 9(b) or the Private Securities Litigation Re29
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A. Quantitative Data on the Federal Courts
I begin by presenting some basic administrative data on the federal courts. I compiled a half-million observations of federal civil cases
filed between May 1, 2005, and May 1, 2010. This data includes codes
for the type and duration of each case, as well as the nature of the disposition of the suit. With this data, I compute the rates at which cases
filed in a given month end in dismissal. 31 This data reveals no break
in trend for dismissal rates in civil cases after either Twombly or Iqbal. 32 See Figure 1.

.03

FIGURE 1: MONTHLY DISMISSAL RATES IN CIVIL CASES FILED
MAY 2005–MAY 2010
Iqbal

0

Dismissal Rate
.01
.02

Twombly

May 2005

May 2007

May 2009

May 2010

form Act. As I note below (at the end of Part III.A), super-heightened forms of
pleading may have different effects.
31 Throughout this article, “dismissal” refers to dismissal for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
32 For details on the data sources and data processing used to create Figures
1 and 2, see William H. J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35
(2013) [hereinafter Hubbard, Testing for Change]. The most important details
to note are that this data excludes pro se litigants and certain sui generis categories of litigation, such as defaulted student loans and prisoner litigation.
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Further, in contrast to predictions that Twombly and Iqbal will
disproportionately affect the filings and dismissals of complaints alleging employment discrimination, 33 trends in dismissal rates for employment discrimination litigation are unaffected. See Figure 2.
Perhaps even more striking than the lack of a spike in dismissals
after Twombly or Iqbal is the low rate at which cases are terminated
by dismissal—according to my data maybe 2 percent of all cases are
terminated by the granting of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. This 2
percent figure is consistent with a massive study of federal docket records by Cecil et al. for the Federal Judicial Center (FJC). 34 Indeed, not
only is the dismissal of a case rare; the mere filing of a motion to dismiss is an uncommon event in federal civil litigation. According to the
FJC study, a motion to dismiss (for failure to state a claim) was filed
in about 6 percent of cases (9 percent in employment discrimination
cases) in 2010. 35 This was an uptick from 2006, when motions to dismiss were filed in about 4 percent of cases (7 percent in employment
discrimination cases), and consistent with earlier studies finding motion to dismiss filings in 6 to 12 percent of cases. 36 Thus, a corollary
puzzle to the modest effect of Twombly or Iqbal is the question of why
motions to dismiss are filed, let alone granted, in so few cases. I will
return to this question in Part III.B.

See notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., OF WAVES AND WATER: A RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ON THE FJC STUDY “MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL” 9 (Working Paper 2011), (Table 1, 14 Table 4
[hereinafter CECIL ET AL., OF WAVES AND WATER]. An examination of these
tables reveals that across all cases (and both sample periods), about 5 percent
of cases involve a motion to dismiss, and about 40 percent of rulings on a motion to dismiss are grants without leave to amend. Thus, 2 percent (0.05 ×
0.40) of cases involve a motion to dismiss being granted without leave to
amend. Of course, this is just a back-of-the-envelope estimate; note, for example, that courts do not ultimately rule on every motion to dismiss that is
filed.
35 See id. at 9, Table 1.
36 THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., USE OF RULE 12(B)(6) IN TWO
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, (1989) reviews three sets of district court docket
records, and finds rulings on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss in only 6 to 12
percent of cases.
33
34
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FIGURE 2: MONTHLY DISMISSAL RATES IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES FILED MAY 2005–MAY 2010
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These aggregate statistics may not, however, tell the whole story.
More nuanced empirical analysis is a complement to the raw statistics. Over the past half-decade, a large number of studies have attempted to quantify the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on federal civil
litigation. Taken together, these studies test two crucial hypotheses
raised by the large literature on plausibility pleading: first, that
Twombly and Iqbal will cause more cases to be dismissed, and second,
that this effect will be most pronounced among employment discrimination cases. 37
“[T]he perception among many practicing attorneys and commentators is
that the [Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss] grant rate has increased, particularly in civil rights cases, employment discrimination, private enforcement
matters, class actions, and proceedings brought pro se.” Miller, supra note 10,
at 21. In most of the literature, this prediction is perhaps so obvious that it
goes unstated; but many make it explicit. See Ward, supra note 8, at 916
(“Post-Twombly, a defendant would predict a higher rate of success on [a Rule
12(b)(6)] motion.”); Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study
of the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1814 (2008) (“Generally, any substantive alteration to the
pleading standard would have an effect on the dismissal rate under
12(b)(6).”). See also notes 14–20.
37
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Every published study of the effect of Twombly has found no statistically significant effect. Hannon, 38 Hatamyar, 39 Hatamyar Moore, 40
Seiner (two studies), 41 and Brescia 42 all present data from published
court opinions before and after Twombly, and none find a statistically
significant change in the share of cases granting motions to dismiss. 43
This is true regardless of whether the study looks across case types or
focuses on civil rights or employment discrimination cases.
Studies on Iqbal, or the combined effect of Twombly and Iqbal,
largely reach the same conclusion. Cecil et al. (two studies), 44 Hatamyar Moore, 45 and Brescia 46 find a rise in dismissals without prejudice after Iqbal, but no change in dismissals with prejudice. 47 For example, Hatamyar Moore looks at a sample of 1,326 opinions ruling on
motions to dismiss decided between May 22, 2005 (two years before
Twombly) and May 18, 2010 (one year after Iqbal). The study focused
on cases citing Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal. Although she finds that
grants with leave to amend rose after Iqbal, the results for dismissals
with prejudice were quite different. The percentage of motions to dismiss that were granted without leave to amend were 40 percent
among cases citing Conley, 39 percent among cases citing Twombly,
and 40 percent among cases citing Iqbal. 48 This result continued to

Hannon, supra note 36.
Hatamyar, supra note 7.
40 Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012)
41 Joseph A, Seiner, Pleading Disability,51 B. C. L. REV. 95 (2010); Joseph A.
Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 (2009).
42 Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY L. J. 235
(2012).
43 As I note in Hubbard, Testing for Change, supra note 31, Hannon, supra
note 36, reports a single significant result in one of his regressions, but this is
due to a specification error. A corrected regression on the same data (not reported, on file with author) yields no significant effect.
44 CECIL ET AL., OF WAVES AND WATER, supra note 33; JOE S. CECIL ET AL.,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS
GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, (Working Paper 2011), [hereinafter CECIL
ET AL., UPDATE])
45 Hataymar Moore, supra note 39.
46 Brescia, supra note 41.
47Hataymar Moore, supra note 39; Brescia, supra note 41.
48Hataymar Moore, supra note 39, at 613.
38
39
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hold when Hatamyar Moore looked within categories of cases (such as
contract, tort, Title VII, etc.). 49
The distinction between dismissals with and without prejudice is
crucial, because the only study on the ultimate effect of dismissals
without prejudice concluded that, after accounting for amended complaints and subsequent motions to dismiss, there was zero change in
the share of cases dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) from the preTwombly to the post-Iqbal period. 50 Thus, the fact that other studies
find increases in dismissals with leave to amend, but no change in
dismissals with prejudice, suggests little effect on the share of cases
effectively terminated by a ruling on a motion to dismiss.
This distinction between dismissals with and without prejudice is
also important in interpreting the results reported by Dodson.Dodson
examines rulings on motions to dismiss on a claim-by-claim basis,
comparing pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods. 51 The analysis pools
together dismissals with and without leave to amend. Dodson finds a
small but statistically significant increase in dismissals (both with and
without prejudice), though it appears that the statistically significant
effect is entirely concentrated among prisoner litigation claims
brought by in forma pauperis prisoners. 52 There is no significant
change in the rate at which district courts dismiss claims in cases with
represented plaintiffs. 53
These simple comparisons of observed dismissal rates, however,
must be approached with caution, as they do not account for the possibility that Twombly or Iqbal had a major effect, but the mix of cases
before and after these cases changed in ways that masked the true effect on dismissal rates. For example, if the plausibility standard announced in Twombly led many plaintiffs not to file suit at all, it is possible that the share of filed cases being dismissed may not change,
even though many (potential) plaintiffs are nonetheless losing their
day in court.

Id. at 618.
See CECIL ET AL., UPDATE, supra note 43. Excluding the “financial instruments” category of cases, which was affected by the home mortgage crisis
that intervened between 2006 and 2010, the share of cases that ultimately
were dismissed in the wake of a motion to dismiss fell from 56.8 percent to
56.2 percent, which is statistically indistinguishable from zero change. See id.
at 7, table A-1 (calculations by author).
51 Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates in Federal Civil Cases, 96 JUDICATURE 127 (2012) [hereinafter Dodson, New Look].
52 This conclusion is based on analysis of id at 132 table 2.
53 Id.
49
50
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Some recent work has attempted to address the possibility of
changes in the composition of filed cases after Twombly and Iqbal. In
my earlier study of the effect of Twombly, I developed an empirical
methodology to address this problem (which is sometimes referred to
as “selection effects”). 54 The essence of this approach is to compare the
outcomes of (1) cases that were filed before Twombly and which could
have been dismissed before Twombly and (2) cases that were filed before Twombly, but which did not have an opportunity to be dismissed
until after Twombly. Because Twombly’s “retirement” of the Conley
dictum was largely a surprise to the bar, any effect of Twombly on the
composition of filed cases would occur only with respect to cases filed
after the Twombly decision. By limiting my analysis to cases filed before the decision, I was able to control for selection effects. Applying
this approach to two data sets, together totaling tens of thousands of
federal civil cases, yielded a very precise estimate of zero effect of
Twombly on (1) the rate at which motions to dismiss were granted and
(2) the share of all cases that were dismissed (for failure to state a
claim). 55
Additional sets of administrative data, only recently made available, has allowed me to extend my analysis to Iqbal. 56 Applying the
same technique to control for selection effects, I have found no statistically significant effect of Iqbal on the rate at which cases are dismissed. Unlike in my study of Twombly, however, my data on Iqbal do
not rule out the possibility that Iqbal had a meaningful effect. I cannot, for example, rule out the possibility that Iqbal has increased the
share of employment discrimination cases that are dismissed by 1 percentage point.
One other study attempts to address selection effects and focuses
on the outcomes of cases in the wake of Iqbal. 57 Gelbach used a
unique, formal model to account for selection effects on the composition of cases with litigated motions to dismiss. 58 He generated a lower
bound on the number of cases “affected” by Twombly and Iqbal that
Hubbard, Testing for Change supra note 31, at 35.
Id. at 54–57.
56 William H.J. Hubbard, Two Models of Pleadings, (2013) (unpublished
working paper) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hubbard, Two Models].
57 It is worth noting, however, that Gelbach corrects for changes in the selection of filed cases for motions to dismiss, but he does not account for the possibility that the composition of filed cases themselves may have changed between 2006 and 2010. Only my studies on Twombly and Iqbal account for
both sources of selection effects.
58 Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012).
54
55
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represents 21.5 percent of all cases in which a motion to dismiss was
filed. 59 To make this number comparable with my results described
above, one must take into account that in the data used by Gelbach,
5.0 percent of all cases involved a motion to dismiss, which means that
the lower bound for “affected cases” is about 1 percent of all cases. 60
His results were very similar for employment discrimination cases. 61
Thus, this lower bound represents a small but meaningful share of
cases.
In short, the studies on Twombly and Iqbal do not demonstrate
that these cases had any major effect on the willingness of district
courts to dismiss cases. The evidence is overwhelming that Twombly,
in particular, has had essentially no impact on dismissal rates. Iqbal,
it appears, is associated with an expected rise in MTD filings, but if it
has led to an increase in the courts’ willingness to dismiss cases, this
latter effect is modest at best. The majority of studies on Iqbal find no
statistically significant effect on dismissals, but there is some evidence
suggesting a small but potentially meaningful effect.
B. Evidence from Practitioners
Surveys of practitioners reinforce these findings. In December
2009 and January 2010, Willging and Lee surveyed both plaintiffs’
and defense attorneys across a range of practice areas and “[m]ost interviewees indicated that they had not seen any impact of the two cases in their practice.” 62 One attorney’s answer left no room for doubt:
“No effect.” 63

This number is statistically different from zero. Id. at 2331.
According to the FJC data he cites, MTDs were filed in 5 percent of cases in
the post-Iqbal sample period, and he estimates a lower bound of 21.5 percent
of these filings were “affected” by Twombly and Iqbal. 21.5 percent of 5 percent is 1.075 percent.
61 Gelbach is careful to point out that the “negatively affected share” was lower for employment discrimination cases (15.4 percent rather than 21.5 percent), a surprising result given the literature. Gelbach, supra note 57, at
2331–32. Because more employment discrimination cases involve motions to
dismiss (9.0 percent, id. at 2326), however, dismissals as a share of all employment discrimination cases are slightly higher (15.4 percent of 9 percent is
1.386 percent).
62 THOMAS E. WILLGING and EMERY G. LEE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR
WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL
LITIGATION, 3 (2010.
63 Id. at 25.
59
60
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These survey responses dovetail with the empirical results on the
rarity of motions to dismiss as well. One respondent, speaking in the
wake of Iqbal, stated, “I have never faced a serious challenge to a
complaint in 20 years of practice and only have had 2–3 motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim filed.” 64
A study commissioned by the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA), an organization of attorneys who represent plaintiffs in employment litigation, lends further support to the notion that
Twombly and Iqbal have had little effect. 65 Hamburg and Koski surveyed members of NELA during October and November 2009—two
and a half years after Twombly and about six month after Iqbal. The
respondents were overwhelmingly critical of Twombly and Iqbal, 66 and
some reported hearing about “others” being hurt by the new pleading
standards. 67
But when describing their own experiences, the respondents were
largely unmoved. At the time of the survey, 92.8 percent of the surveyed plaintiffs’ attorney had never, in two-and-one-half years, had a
complaint dismissed under Twombly or Iqbal. 68 In addition to those
respondents who stated that these cases have had “[n]o effect,” some
respondents had seen not seen a single MTD filed under Twombly or
Iqbal. 69

Id. at 25.
“NELA advances employee rights and serves lawyers who advocate for
equality and justice in the workplace. NELA provides assistance and support
to lawyers in protecting the rights of employees against the greater resources
of their employers and the defense bar” Hamburg and Koski, supra note 10,
at 3
66 Of the respondents who offered their own comments about pleading, 85 out
of the 150 (by my count) made comments criticizing Twombly and/or Iqbal.
67 Hamburg and Koski, supra note 10 at 62. See also id. at 65 (“I understand
from colleagues . . .”).
68 Id. at 28. In raw numbers, 195 respondents had filed at least one complaint
and only 14—fourteen!—had even had a single complaint get dismissed since
Twombly. The survey did not ask about experiences with cases being dismissed before Twombly.
69 Four respondents specifically said, “No effect.” Id. at 68. Six others said
something similarly explicit. Of course, the comments about “always” pleading with specificity imply no effect as well. Two respondents said that there
were no MTDs filed under Twombly and Iqbal, and a third note that there
were “initially . . . a few” but none since. Id. at 65, 68.
64
65
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C. Evidence from the States
Another data point, or perhaps fifty-one more, come from the experiences of state courts and the courts of the District of Columbia.
While the civil procedure rules of most states (and the District of Columbia) essentially mirror the Federal Rules, seventeen states have
pleading rules that require some version of “fact pleading”—a pleading
standard ostensibly higher than plausibility pleading. 70 These seventeen states comprise more than half the U.S. population. Yet I know of
no claims that pleading practice is dramatically different in these
states, let alone any broad normative claims that plaintiffs are disadvantaged in these states, either before or after Twombly. 71
Rather, the one study that has looked for differential patterns
across fact pleading and notice pleading states in the wake of
Twombly and Iqbal has found none. Curry and Ward search for
changes in patterns of removal from state to federal court, based on
the theory that defendants in notice-pleading states will now have a
greater preference for pleading standards in federal court. 72 But they
find no evidence that patterns of removal to federal court responded to
Twombly and Iqbal, and no difference in response between notice
pleading and fact pleading states. 73
In sorting states into these categories, I rely upon John B. Oakley & Arthur
F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems
of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986), and John B.Oakley, A Fresh
Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L. J. 354 (2002–2003). According to these studies, the fact-pleading states are Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. In this context, “fact pleading” includes “code pleading” and
“civil pleading,” i.e., pleading under the civil law system, which is used in
Louisiana.
71 If I may add the most dubious sort of empirical evidence—the personal anecdote: I practiced in Illinois (a fact-pleading jurisdiction) for five years before
Twombly. I litigated cases in both state court (fact pleading) and federal court
(notice pleading). In terms of length, specificity, and factual detail, the statecourt and federal-court complaints I encountered were interchangeable.
72 Jill L. Curry & Matthew Alex Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where
Plaintiffs File? A Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 905 (2013).
73 And while hardly dispositive, it is worth noting that to the extent that
there are claims about “judicial hellholes” that are (allegedly) inordinately
pro-plaintiff, such “hellholes” reside primarily in fact-pleading, rather than
notice-pleading, states. A recent report from the American Tort Reform
Foundation on “judicial hellholes” lists fourteen state-court jurisdictions as
70

2-Nov-13]

A Theory of Pleading

19

Looking more broadly, Scott Dodson notes that the United States’
concept of notice pleading is unique among countries; “America has
the most lax pleading system in the world.” 74 Often, civil law jurisdictions not only require fact pleading, but evidence, when a complaint is
filed. Yet Dodson indicates that there appears to be little concern internationally over these differences in pleading rules. 75
D. Evidence from Doctrine
Finally, the procedural history and opinions in Conley and
Twombly—and a brief look at some cases in the interim—provide further indications that one might have expected little effect from
Twombly and Iqbal.
1. The Conley Opinion
The first clue comes from Conley itself, in which the complaint
made the legal claim that the defendant union violated the plaintiffs’
right of “fair representation” under the Railway Labor Act. The funny
thing about Conley is that the pleadings in Conley were rife with factual detail. The Court summarized the facts alleged in the plaintiffs’
complaint:
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans
Railroad at its Houston Freight House. Local 28 of the Brotherhood was the designated bargaining agents under the Railway Labor Act for the bargaining unit to which petitioners belonged.
A contract existed between the Union and the Railroad which
gave the employees in the bargaining unit certain protection
from discharge and loss of seniority.

“judicial hellholes” or on a “watch list.” See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2011–2012, 2 (2012). Ten of these fourteen “hellhole” jurisdictions are in fact-pleading states: California, Florida, Illinois
(three), Louisiana, New Jersey (two), New York, and Pennsylvania. The notice pleading jurisdictions on these lists are in Alabama, Mississippi, Nevada,
and West Virginia. As above, I base the categorization of states into fact
pleading and notice pleading categories on Oakley & Coon supra note 69 and
Oakley, supra note 69.
74 Dodson, New Look, supra note 50, at 447.
75 Id.
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In May 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs held by
petitioners or other Negroes all of whom were either discharged
or demoted.
In truth the 45 jobs were not abolished at all but instead filled
by whites as the Negroes were ousted, except for a few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their old jobs but with
loss of seniority.
Despite repeated pleas by petitioners, the Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to protect them against these discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection comparable to that given white employees. 76
Given these factual allegations, there was the question of whether
the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act bars racial discrimination by the union in pursuing grievances brought by
union members. This was a question of the meaning of the Railway
Labor Act, and went to the “legal sufficiency” of the complaint. This
was, in fact, the primary question addressed in Conley. 77
But once that question is resolved in the affirmative, is there any
doubt that this complaint contains enough in the way of factual detail
to state a plausible claim under Twombly? While the legal sufficiency
of the complaint posed a serious question, the “factual sufficiency” of
the complaint in Conley—whether it pleaded enough factual matter to
pass muster under Rule 8(a)—did not, as the procedural history of
Conley demonstrated. The district court in Conley had not dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim; it had dismissed the claim,
and the appellate court had affirmed, on jurisdictional grounds. In the
district court, the issue of the factual sufficiency of the pleading was
the defendant’s fourth-string argument for dismissal. Indeed, the issue
was not even briefed in the Supreme Court. 78 As Reinert noted, “Conley was a strange poster-child for notice pleading—the plaintiffs had
provided extensive factual detail, they had specified their legal claims,
and neither party briefed or addressed Rule 8.” 79
Further, Emily Sherwin and others have taken care to point out
that the famous “no sets of facts” language appeared in Conley’s discussion of the legal sufficiency of the complaint, i.e., whether the complaint contains a legal claim that would be viable if facts existed that
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 43 (1957) (paragraph breaks added).
Id. at 45–46.
78 See Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley, in CIVIL PROCERDURE STORIES,
295 (Kevin M. Clairmont, ed., 2008).
79 Reinert, supra note 12, at 128..
76
77
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met its elements. 80 It was only at the tail end of the opinion that the
Court addressed the factual sufficiency of the complaint. 81 On this issue, the Court noted that “all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ [citing Rule 8] that will give the defendant fair
notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” 82 Given the factual detail of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court
had “no doubt” that their complaint was factually sufficient. 83
2. From Conley to Twombly
Long before Twombly and Iqbal, a small literature documented the
consistent practice of the federal courts to expect factually detailed
pleadings, even in the wake of Conley. A quarter-century ago, Marcus
lamented: “Whatever the reason, for more than twenty years after
Conley, there was virtually no academic recognition that pleading
practice had not vanished; defendants continued to make motions to
dismiss and courts continued to grant them.” 84 Marcus concluded notice pleading was a “chimera.” 85 Fairman called it a “myth,” providing
numerous (albeit not systematic) examples of what appeared to be a
wide range of ad hoc standards employed by district courts in ruling
on motions to dismiss. 86
Nonetheless, Conley’s famous dictum did not go away. As recently
as Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 87 the Court recited the rule that “[a]
court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the
allegations.” 88 But Leatherman, 89 another oft-cited pre-Twombly

Sherwin, supra note 76,at 315–16. As noted above, the legal question was
whether a union violated its duty of representation when discriminating on
the basis of race in pursuing grievances raised by fired railroad employees.
81 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (“The respondents also argue that the complaint
failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimination.”).
82 Id. at 47.
83 Id. at 48.
84 Marcus, supra note 4 at 434.
85 Id. at 451.
86 Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
987, 988 (2003).
87 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
88 Id. at 514 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
89 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics and Intelligence Control Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993).
80
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pleading case, avoided citing this dictum, quoting instead Conley’s discussion of the factual sufficiency of the complaint. 90
The Supreme Court itself in Twombly noted that over the previous
half-century, “a good many judges and commentators have balked at
taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard.” 91 A striking example of such a “balk” is Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 92 which, like Twombly, involved a claim of antitrust conspiracy. Twenty-eight years before Twombly, the Car Carriers court
bluntly stated, “Conley has never been interpreted literally.” 93 In place
of the “no set of facts” language from Conley, the court employed the
rule that “a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory.” 94 Just as in Twombly, the
facts alleged in support of the illegal agreements were all entirely consistent with competitive behavior, and, just as in Twombly, the court
rested its decision on that ground. In fact, in no fewer than three separate places did the court justify its ruling by pointing out that the
specific allegations of illegal agreements were “implausible.” 95
3. The Twombly Opinions
The procedural history of Twombly offers clues as well. The most
telling, if overlooked, fact in the Twombly litigation is this: in 2003,
the district court dismissed the complaint. 96 In other words, the Supreme Court’s “sweeping,” “startling,” and “surprising” 97 decision in
Twombly simply affirmed the decision of the district court, made four
years prior. 98
Id. at 168 (quoting language from Conley reproduced above in text accompanying note 82).
91 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007).
92 Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984).
93 Id. at 1106.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1109–10.
96 Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D. N.Y. 2003), vacated,
425 F. 3d 99 (2005), rev’d 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
97 Smith, supra note 9 at 1063.
98 Of course, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not generally an appealable
order, so we might expect that any Supreme Court decision on the standard
governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss would involve a dismissal at the
district court level. Interestingly, the district court in Iqbal had denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss under Twombly, but the denial was appealed
under the collateral order doctrine.
90

2-Nov-13]

A Theory of Pleading

23

Notable, too, is the Second Circuit’s opinion, which was reversed
by the Supreme Court. It anticipated the terminology of “plausibility”
pleading, even as it vacated the district court opinion. Consider the
following quotes, which are drawn from the Second Circuit’s and the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly. One might have difficulty telling the earlier opinion from the one that reversed it.
A: “If a pleaded conspiracy is implausible on the basis of the
facts pleaded—if the allegations amount to no more than ‘unlikely speculation’—the complaint will be dismissed.”
B: “[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”
C: “We are mindful that a balance is being struck here, that on
one side of that balance is the sometimes colossal expense of
undergoing discovery, that such costs themselves likely lead
defendants to pay plaintiffs to settle what would ultimately be
shown to be meritless claims, [and] that the success of such
meritless claims encourages others to be brought . . . .”
D: “[Pleading rules serve] the practical purpose of preventing a
plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up
the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.
. . . Thus, it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, . . . but quite another
to forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive.” 99
In short, the shortcoming of the Second Circuit opinion was not a failure to think in terms of plausibility. Instead, it appears that, to the
eyes of the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit simply misapplied its
standard to the allegations in the complaint. Stated more broadly, the
complaint in Conley would have survived under Twombly, and the
complaint in Twombly was (in fact) dismissed under Conley. 100 These

A: Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp, 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2nd Cir. 2005), rev'd 550
U,S, 544 (2007); B: Bell Atl. Corp. v. Tombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570; C: Twombly.
425 F.3d at 117; D: Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
100 I do not discuss Iqbal because the timing of the lower court opinions prevents an easy inference. The district court opinion was pre-Twombly, but the
circuit court opinion was post-Twombly.
99
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facts together raise the possibility that Twombly was error correction,
and plausibility pleading was nothing new.
***
Evidence from every quarter compels the conclusion that the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on pleadings practice in the federal courts
has been modest. Both studies of court data and surveys of practitioners find little indication that practice has changed much. Juxtaposing
federal and state practice suggests that the labels “notice pleading”
and “fact pleading” represent no striking differences in practice. And
even the treatment of pleadings in the lower courts in Conley and
Twombly themselves, not to mention other lower courts in the interim
period, suggests that even before Twombly, many federal courts were
expecting to see factually detailed allegations.
If neither Conley nor Twombly/Iqbal seem to have defined the actual practice of pleading, perhaps our theories about pleading should
not begin with court doctrine and pleading rules. If no new trends in
dismissal rates emerged after Twombly or Iqbal, perhaps our theories
about pleading should look toward what remained the same after
Twombly and Iqbal, rather than what changed. In Part III, I approach
pleading from the point of view of the litigants, rather than the court.
III. PLEADING, LITIGATION, AND SETTLEMENT
Let us undertake a thought experiment: Imagine a pleading regime in which no complaint can be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, so long as it names a defendant and describes some kind of injury. I will call this hypothetical regime “no pleading standard.” (This
may not be far from the idealized conception of “notice pleading.” 101)
Since it is costly to prepare a lengthy complaint, rich with factual detail and legal background, one might expect that under no pleading
standard, complaints would be short, sparsely pleaded documents
that, were Twombly to suddenly appear, would surely be dismissed.
This conclusion would be too hasty. While detailed pleading is costly, so is litigation. Herein, I argue that in general:
Or at least an aspiration of the drafters of the Federal Rules. In proceedings on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, Charles E. Clark, primary architect of the rules, noted that the English Equity Rules of 1912 abolished the demurrer and remarked that in the Federal Rules, “We don’t go as
far as the English rules, which I personally think we should eventually.”
Statement of Charles E. Clark, supra note 28, at 240.
101
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(1) only a plaintiff who has facts establishing a plausible claim
will file a lawsuit, and
(2) when the plaintiff files suit, she will plead those facts in detail.
This is true even under no pleading standard. In Part III.A, I will present the argument in its most general form, setting aside the possibility of the “nuisance suit” (i.e., a lawsuit brought solely to extract a settlement because the defendant faces the prospect of high litigation
costs). 102 In Part III.B, I then make the argument that, under no
pleading standard, even plaintiffs bringing nuisance suits will tend to
file detailed complaints for strategic reasons. Part III.C then raises
some hypotheses about how the plaintiff-driven practice of detailed
pleading may have shaped judicial views on pleading.
In Part IV, I then return to the empirical puzzles raised in the Introduction and describe how the understanding of pleading in Part III
explains these findings.
A. Plausibility Pleading Given No Pleading Standard
Litigation is expensive; thus, a plaintiff will not bother to file suit
if she doesn’t stand a good chance of winning. But a plaintiff will not
believe that she has a good chance of winning unless she has in mind
some facts that persuade her that she can win the suit. And, again because litigation is expensive, the plaintiff would prefer to settle than
undertake a lengthy process of litigation and trial. Thus, she has every incentive to signal the strength of her case by communicating her
facts to the potential defendant, if doing so will encourage the defendant to settle.
The defendant, also concerned about litigation costs, would prefer
to settle than go to trial with a plaintiff who brings a strong claim, but
the defendant is wary of a plaintiff with a weak claim bluffing her way
to a settlement. The defendant will be reluctant to settle absent some
assurance that the plaintiff’s claim is strong enough that it is worth
paying a settlement. Thus, it is essential that the plaintiff with a
plausible claim credibly communicate her facts to the defendant.
The plaintiff does so through pleading, which is a nearly ideal
mechanism for making a credible signal: a complaint is costly to prepare, made in writing, public, and signed under penalty of sanctions

102

This is, of course, the “in terrorem” scenario contemplated by Twombly.
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against both the plaintiff and her lawyer. 103 In other words, a factually
detailed, plausible complaint makes the plaintiff’s case credible, by
backing up her claims with her money and reputation. Crucially, nothing in this argument depends on the existence, let alone strictness, of
a pleading standard.
A simple model formalizes this intuition somewhat and will become useful in assessing the paradox of pleading described in the Introduction. Take a (potential) plaintiff and a (potential) defendant.
The plaintiff has been injured and the defendant may be liable for the
injury. The plaintiff can file a lawsuit seeking a judgment in the
amount 𝐽𝐽 against the defendant. If the plaintiff sues and the parties do
not settle, it will cost the plaintiff 𝐶𝐶 to litigate. Before deciding whether to sue, the plaintiff must assess the information available to her in
order to make a judgment about her likelihood of winning the lawsuit.
If we call this probability 𝜋𝜋, then the expected judgment is simply the
judgment amount times the probability that she wins the judgment:
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋. Given this expected judgment, the plaintiff will be willing to sue
and go to trial if the expected judgment from litigating exceeds the
costs of litigating:
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 ≥ 𝐶𝐶

If not, then it is not worth pursuing litigation; the plaintiff stands to
lose more in litigation costs than she stands to win in judgment. 104
From this, one can immediately see that for any claim for judgment 𝐽𝐽 that costs 𝐶𝐶 to litigate, only a plaintiff with a relatively strong
case (a high probability 𝜋𝜋) will be willing to sue. 105 Importantly, the
facts available to the plaintiff determine 𝜋𝜋.
A plaintiff who lacks facts implying a relatively high likelihood of
success will abandon her claim, unless she can convince the defendant
to settle. Such a plaintiff might approach the defendant and demand a
settlement without filing a lawsuit. But a rational defendant will anSee, e.g., FRCP 11; 28 USC §1927. Rule 11 requires that “factual contentions have evidentiary support,” lest the pleading party or its attorneys face
sanctions. By pleading detailed facts, a plaintiff could pre-empt any threat of
a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Pleading parties thus have yet another an
incentive to plead facts in support of legal claims regardless of the pleading
standard. See Randal C. Picker. 2007. Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping of
Antitrust. 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 176 (2007).
104 This result is simply an application of the canonical Landes-Posner-Gould
model.
105 Note that while this model does not incorporate risk aversion, doing so
would only amplify the plaintiff-screening effect I describe here.
103
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ticipate this possibility, and he will know that if he refuses settlement,
the plaintiff will simply abandon her claim rather than hale him into
court.
This, in turn, creates a problem for a plaintiff who has a strong
claim. She, too, would prefer to settle out-of-court rather than sue, because litigation is costly. But a defendant may refuse to settle if the
defendant cannot reliably distinguish between her and someone with
a weaker claim. In this scenario, it benefits the plaintiff with the
strong case to file a lawsuit and use the complaint as a credible signal
of her willingness to pursue litigation. Detailed pleading is costly, but
it allows the plaintiff with a strong claim to separate herself from the
plaintiff with a weak claim. By doing this, she brings the defendant to
the settlement table.
Applying some numbers to this model will make it more concrete
and allow me to assess whether the paradox of pleading describes a
scenario that is likely to arise.
Consider a large group of potential plaintiffs who might bring fairly typical employment discrimination claims in federal court. For example, you could imagine the set of all female mid-level employees
who lost their jobs in a given time period. It is possible that any given
one was fired for reasons related to sex discrimination, but it is also
possible that she were fired for entirely separate reasons, such as poor
individual performance or downsizing by the employer. Employment
discrimination claims tend not to be high-stakes by federal court
standards; but I will assign a robust potential judgment of 𝐽𝐽 =
$500,000 to each plaintiff in this scenario. This corresponds to the 75th
percentile for stakes for employment discrimination cases in the study
reported in Lee and Willging. 106 Litigating in federal court, however, is
expensive even for plaintiffs bringing relatively modest claims. A rule
of thumb is that a party ought to be prepared to spend $100,000 to litigate in federal court, and in fact the 75th percentile for the costs of
litigating to trial (for the plaintiff) in Lee and Willging is $122,500. 107
Given these numbers, a plaintiff in this scenario will only be willing to sue if
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 ≥ 𝐶𝐶

𝜋𝜋(500,000) ≥ 122,500
See generally EMERY G. LEE & THOMAS WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009).
107 Median costs are $44,000, and median stakes are $108,750. Id.
106
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𝜋𝜋 ≥ 0.245

Now assume, for the moment, that every plaintiff in this group has
no information bearing on the defendant’s discriminatory intent in her
case. This set of plaintiffs is uniformly uninformed about the merits of
their individual claims. In this situation, will every potential plaintiff
in this group be willing to sue? This depends on whether 𝜋𝜋 is at least
about 25 percent. 108 Of course, this number is unknowable. In principle, it could be 1 percent, or 10 percent, or 99 percent. But while no
one knows what the probability is that a randomly chosen woman who
lost her job will be able to win a judgment on a claim that her employer intentionally discriminated against her, it seems doubtful that her
chances of winning are one-in-four or better. 109 If this is right, then a
plaintiff who has no facts tending to show that she, specifically, was
the victim of discrimination will not be willing to sue.
Thus, only a plaintiff who has probative, favorable facts about her
claim will be willing to sue. In some cases, the plaintiff knows that she
was a hard-working employee who received positive evaluations from
other supervisors. In some cases, the plaintiff knows that she was replaced by a worker who was not a member of her protected class. In
some cases, the plaintiff heard discriminatory epithets from her supervisors. And so on. The plaintiff has some specific facts that are probative of discrimination, and thus she finds it worthwhile to sue. And
because she wants a settlement from the defendant, it is her best
strategy to plead with maximum detail, even if (as I have assumed
throughout this Part) there is no pleading standard.
Of course, one may doubt that plaintiffs will make such coolheaded calculations about litigation payoffs when they feel they have
been wronged. This may be true; but while I have simply referred to
the “plaintiff” in this discussion, it may be more realistic to treat the
decisionmaker as the plaintiffs’ attorney. Most individual plaintiffs
hire attorneys on a contingency basis. In other words, the attorney covers the plaintiff’s litigation costs, getting repaid only if and when the
plaintiff obtains a recovery. 110 It is the attorney, not the plaintiff, who
Median costs and stakes imply that 𝜋𝜋 ≥ 0.405.
Note that I limit this discussion to claims of intentional discrimination;
i.e., disparate treatment. Of course, one can bring disparate impact, rather
than disparate treatment, claims. But the “paradox of pleading” is about disparate treatment claims. The asymmetry of information motivating the paradox of pleading is the defendant’s knowledge of his intent.
110 Note that this definition includes arrangements in which the attorney’s
payment is contingent on winning, regardless of whether the attorney is paid
a percentage of the plaintiff’s recovery. For example, statutory fee-shifting in
108
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is financing the litigation, and therefore it is the attorney, not the
plaintiff, who decides whether a potential lawsuit would be costjustified. 111 And given that the attorney’s livelihood depends on making that judgment correctly, one should have little doubt that this
model works as a fair approximation of the gatekeeping function that
plaintiffs’ attorney perform.
Further, much of this argument applies equally to the pro se plaintiff or pro bono attorney who is uninterested in cost-benefit considerations but simply wants to see justice done or desires to have her day in
court. In these scenarios, the plaintiff deeply and sincerely feels
wronged. If a plaintiff feels she has been wronged, why does she feel
this way? Presumably because she witnessed or experienced something that led her to believe she was legally wronged. What she witnessed or experienced are facts, and she will be able to plead with factual detail. 112
Indeed, given a limited budget of time and credit (for litigation expenses) that she can extend to her clients, an attorney working on contingency must concentrate her efforts on cases with the highest settlement value. 113 This fact is widely recognized, even by the harshest
critics of Twombly and Iqbal. 114 What has been underappreciated,
however, is that fact that the basis upon which the attorney makes
judgments about the value of a case is whatever facts that her potential client, or her own independent investigation, reveals. And because
favor of prevailing plaintiffs is a contingent form of compensation so long as
the attorney recovers nothing if the plaintiff does not prevail. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (holding that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee.”).
111 A plaintiffs’ attorney working on contingency must offset the entire cost of
litigating every case with a fraction of the judgments in the successful cases.
This only magnifies the incentive to screen cases for quality (i.e., high 𝜋𝜋). Indeed, an important study of the practice of contingency fee lawyers from the
pre-Twombly era found that “[l]ack of liability alone accounts for the largest
proportion of cases declined,” rather than reasons such as inadequate damages, the case being outside lawyer’s area of practice, or other reasons. Kritzer,
supra note 30, at 27.
112 Of course, this hypothetical plaintiff’s complaint may be dismissed anyway, if the facts constituting her grievance do not give rise to a legal claim.
But this is legal insufficiency of the complaint, and Twombly and Iqbal did
not nothing to alter the requirement that complaint be legally sufficient.
113 To the extent that attorneys working on a pro bono basis and legal aid
providers are oversubscribed, one should again expect plaintiffs’ attorneys to
screen cases on plausible merit before filing.
114 See Schneider, supra note 1; Miller, supra note 10, at 67–68.
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the only cases that get filed are the cases where the facts make it
plausible that the attorney will recover a fee, a plausibility pleading
standard will do little more than no pleading standard. Even after
Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiffs’ attorney, not the judge, serves as
the gatekeeper for the federal courts on the basis of merit.
As noted earlier, surveys of attorneys elicited many responses
among plaintiffs’ lawyers that Twombly and Iqbal had little effect on
their practice. These surveys responses go on to say that screening
cases for merits was a regular practice long before Twombly:
“I plead facts based on the prescreening I do before filing a
case. My work is done up front and I plead with specificity.”115
“Plaintiff’s counsel who practice wholly in this area also generally take nearly all work on a contingent fee basis, as almost no
clients can afford to pay attorney's fees, and therefore are already extraordinarily careful in case selection.” 116
“I have always carefully screened my cases.” 117
These surveys also confirm that factually detailed pleading has always
been the norm:
“I have always drafted detailed complaints.” 118
“We have always included more than is necessary for notice
pleadings.” 119
“I never did notice pleading, always much more.” 120
“I have always done very fact-intensive pleading and could always add more facts if needed.” 121
Given all this, it should not be surprising that, as Stancil and other
have surmised, “the vast majority of litigated cases already satisfy the
heightened [pleading] standard.” 122
WILLGING & LEE, supra note 61,at 29.
Hamburg and Koski, supra note 10, at 62.
117 Id. at 64.
118 Id. at 64. By my count, 31 respondents volunteered something to this effect. Of these, 27 explicitly said that they had “always” pleaded with detail.
Id. at 62–74. In contrast, 7 said that they plead more facts, 3 noted that defendants are filing more MTDs, 1 attorney mentioned a complaint being dismissed and 1 said a case was not filed because of Twombly and Iqbal.
119 WILLGING & LEE, supra note 61, at 28.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 28–29.
122 Stancil supra note 4, at 126.
115
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Of course, there may be situations where the desire to signal case
strength is overridden by other strategic considerations, and the
plaintiff will want to file a deliberately ambiguous or sparse pleading. 123 What is important to note here is that the withholding of detail
is strategic, rather than a reflection of a lack of information on the
part of the plaintiff. (As argued above, a true lack of information
would be a reason for the plaintiffs’ attorney not to take the case.)
Thus, the plaintiff could always survive a motion to dismiss through
repleading with greater detail. 124
This is not to say that any pleading standard, no matter how strict,
will have no effect. Rather, “plausibility” pleading has little bite because plaintiffs’ attorneys already screen out implausible cases at the
filing stage, no matter how low the pleading standard. If a “plausibility” standard morphs into something stricter, such that “plausible”
cases may nonetheless get dismissed at the pleading stage, then litigation may look very different than it did before Twombly. For now, at
least, the Supreme Court says the standard is simply “plausibility,”
and the data so far are consistent with this.
B. Detailed Pleading in Nuisance Suits
Concern about the “in terrorem” effect of litigation costs on settlement value was expressly cited by the majority in Twombly as motivation for requiring plausible pleadings. 125 In Part III.A above, I set

See, e.g., WILLGING & LEE, supra note 61, at 29 (quoting a plaintiffs’ attorney to say, “As a plaintiff I plead enough to tell the story but avoid pleading
facts that might come back to haunt me”); Coe v. N. Pipe Products, Inc., 589
F.Supp.2d 1055, 1098 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (in employment discrimination case,
allowing plaintiff to invoke either a mixed-motives or disparate treatment
theory at summary judgment when complaint was ambiguous as to the nature of the theory).
124 This dynamic of strategic ambiguity followed by, if necessary, detailed and
specific pleading explains why, among the small percentage of cases that do
face motions to dismiss, a large fraction have the motions granted, but with
leave to amend. See CECIL ET AL., OF WAVES AND WATER, supra note 33, at 14
Table 4 (reporting that 35.3 percent of motions to dismiss in 2010 were
granted with leave to amend). In many cases with such dismissals, the plaintiff files an amended complaint that survives further challenge. See CECIL ET
AL., UPDATE, supra note 43 at 10 Table A-4 (reporting that only 42.5 percent
of cases in 2010 in which a motion to dismiss was granted were terminated
within 90 days of the granting of the motion).
125 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007).
123
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aside the possibility of a plaintiff bringing a lawsuit partly or solely on
the basis of its nuisance value. I now address this possibility.
It has long been recognized that litigation is a strategic game, and
that the burden and timing of litigation costs can factor into whether
the parties settle, and for how much. 126 A canonical paper on this topic
by Rosenberg and Shavell gives the example of a plaintiff who can file
(at minimal cost) a complaint, even though both the plaintiff and the
defendant know that the case has no merit. 127 Their model predicts
that the defendant will not litigate the case and win; instead, the defendant will settle with the plaintiff. Why? Because defending the case
is costly, and since both the plaintiff and defendant know that the case
is meritless, they will agree to a “nuisance settlement”—a positive
amount lower than the defendant’s cost of defending against the
claim. 128
Robert Bone has applied this logic to pleading and motions to dismiss. 129 He claims, echoing Rosenberg and Shavell, that the most a
meritless suit could extract from a defendant is the defendant’s cost of
answering the complaint. His explanation is that once the complaint is
answered, the plaintiff must expend additional resources to continue
the lawsuit, and if the suit is meritless, the plaintiff will not do so. 130
By this logic, meritless suits will be rare. Because “answering is seldom more costly than filing, the model predicts that few frivolous
plaintiffs will find it worthwhile to sue.” 131
Given this model of pleading and settlement, it seems that the
problem of frivolous litigation which so preoccupied the Twombly court
is unlikely to be very costly to defendants, assuming that it happens at
all. But this model of pleading and settlement understates the relevance of discovery costs to settlement. So long as the plaintiff’s costs of
conducting discovery are less than the defendant’s costs, the plaintiff
can refuse the “nuisance settlement” predicted by Rosenberg and
Shavell and Bone, force the defendant to file an answer, and then iniThere is large game-theoretic literature on nuisance litigation. For a detailed review of the literature, and more formal treatment of the pleading
strategies described below, see Hubbard, Two Models, supra note 55.
127 David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell,. A Model in which Suits Are Brought
for Their Nuisance Value. 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
128 Id. at 4.
129 Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 11, at 873. Rosenberg and Shavell’s
model is sufficiently abstract that the cost of “defense” to which they refer
could include all or some of the costs of a MTD, an answer, or discovery.
130 Id. at 921 & n.202.
131 ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
150 (2003).
126
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tiate discovery, at which point the defendant is willing to settle—but
this time, for any amount less than the cost of complying with the obligations of discovery.
This is not a trivial difference. The cost of copying each paragraph
of the plaintiff’s complaint and then inserting the word “Denied” beneath each one may not give a wealthy defendant pause; but the cost
of preserving, collecting, reviewing, and producing millions of pages of
records and electronically stored information will.
In order for this strategy to succeed, however, the plaintiffs’ attorney must ensure that the plaintiff’s threat to pursue discovery after
the defendant files an answer is credible. To do this, the plaintiff must
make pursuing discovery after the defendant answers as costless as
possible for herself. If she does not, the plaintiff’s threat to impose discovery costs on the defendant becomes less credible, because following
through on the threat requires expenditures by the plaintiff as well.
For this reason, the timing of litigation expenses affects the credibility of threats to pursue litigation, and plaintiffs have an incentive to
front-load discovery costs to the maximum extent possible. By gathering all information and evidence from the plaintiff before the case is
filed, the plaintiffs’ attorney turns all of the plaintiff’s costs of discovery into sunk costs. By the time the defendant files its answer, the
plaintiff faces little or no additional costs if she moves forward with
discovery. 132
The only challenge that remains for the plaintiffs’ attorney in executing this strategy is to credibly communicate to the defendant that
the plaintiff’s costs of discovery have already been sunk. This is a challenge because every plaintiffs’ lawyer will have an incentive to claim
this is true in order to gain an advantage in settlement negotiations.
It is here that detailed pleading serves as a nearly ideal device to credibly signal that that the plaintiff has sunk her discovery costs.
At this point, one may wonder how a plaintiff with a low-merit or
meritless claim can expend costs on detailed pleading. It is worth noting that—at least in the absence of a plausibility pleading standard—
the detailed pleadings need not contain allegations that, if true, tend
Of course, it will often be the case that it is much easier for the plaintiff to
gather new evidence during discovery, when it can compel production from
the defendant, than in advance of litigation. But note that in the scenario described here, the plaintiff is not seeking to discover information from the defendant in the pre-litigation period. Rather, the plaintiff is sinking the costs
of her own production, as well as the costs of developing legal theories and
the like. In a nuisance suit, the plaintiff has no desire prior to litigation to
gather information in the possession of the defendant. By assumption, the
(lack of) merit of the claim is already common knowledge to the parties.
132
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to prove plaintiff's case. Instead, the plaintiff needs only ensure that
the details in the complaint credibly reflect the expenditure of effort
that otherwise would have to occur after the complaint was filed. In
this respect, documenting a failed investigation works as well as documenting a successful one. If this sounds far-fetched, it may be. But
perhaps, at least to the eyes of seven Supreme Court justices, this is
exactly what the complaint in Twombly did. 133
Nonetheless, whether the plaintiff’s complaint details a successful
or a failed investigation is relevant to one thing: a motion to dismiss.
So far in this Part, I have assumed no pleading standard, but here we
see where a requirement of plausibility pleading may have bite. If the
suit is totally meritless or extremely weak, the complaint may not
survive a motion to dismiss under a plausibility pleading standard.
The best the plaintiff can do is a true “nuisance settlement” in the
sense described by Bone. But in cases that have some (or even great)
merit, the plaintiffs’ attorney can still use the costs of discovery to negotiate a more favorable settlement. Thus, even in a case of limited
merit a plaintiffs’ attorney may want to invest in a strong pleading if
the defendant’s costs of discovery are likely to be very high.
It is important here to note that this same argument does not apply to detailed answers to pleadings. Given the argument above, a
reader may wonder why, if detailed pleading is so advantageous, defendants almost never answer in detail. 134 The reason is that a defendant stands to gain nothing from detailed pleading in a nuisance
suit. The point of detailed pleading in nuisance litigation is to document the expenditure of one’s litigation costs—but the defendant’s
primary objective in a nuisance suit is avoiding its litigation costs. 135
Indeed, a nuisance suit is filed precisely because the defendant would
rather settle than sink the costs of litigation. 136
See Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Twombly v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220), 2003 WL
25629874 (containing 29 pages of allegations in 96 numbered paragraphs,
with 94 of the paragraphs “based upon . . . the investigation of counsel.”).
134 See Picker, supra note 101, at 175 (“As a look at any recently filed answer
makes clear, we know how the defendant is going to answer: the defendant is
simply going to deny the allegation.”).
135 Recall that in nuisance litigation, both parties already know that the claim
lacks merit, so detailed pleading does not serve to communicate information
about the strength of the claims.
136 As I explain elsewhere, under certain conditions a defendant does have a
counter-strategy to deter nuisance suits of this type, but it has nothing to do
with pleading. The key for the defendant is to hire litigators on a retainer,
rather than hourly, basis to defend potential nuisance suits. See Hubbard,
133
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In short, a “nuisance suit” will only have settlement value if the
plaintiff’s threat to impose discovery costs on the defendant is credible. In order for the plaintiff’s threat to be credible, the plaintiff must
not herself be deterred from litigating by her own discovery costs.
How, then, can a plaintiff make the threat to litigate credible? One
way is for the plaintiff to “front-load” much of her discovery costs, by
engaging in a thorough pre-complaint investigation: identifying and
collecting documents and witnesses, conducting legal research, and
developing litigation strategy. By sinking all of these costs before the
lawsuit even begins, the plaintiff will face little additional cost when
responding to discovery from the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff can
credibly threaten to impose burdensome discovery demands on the defendant, undeterred by the prospect of her own costs of responding to
discovery. 137 Most importantly, considering the possibility of nuisance
litigation does not change my central result from Part III.A: that even
under no pleading standard, plaintiffs who file lawsuits will plead
with factual detail.
Thus, the impact on Twombly and Iqbal on this category of cases is
more subtle than commonly understood. As detailed pleading was the
norm long before Twombly, we should not expect Twombly and Iqbal
to change the presence or quantity of detail in pleadings—even frivolous pleadings! But Twombly and Iqbal do not necessarily require detailed pleading; they require plausible pleading. What does this mean
in the context of nuisance litigation? By definition, a nuisance suit is
one in which the parties know that the plaintiff’s claim will not prevail
on the merits.
For some types of cases, even plaintiffs bringing nuisance suits can
draft plausible complaints. Imagine an employment discrimination
complaint that alleges that the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class, that the plaintiff was fired while other employees—all white
males under 40—were not fired, and the plaintiff was replaced by a
white male under 40 whose resume and experience were weaker than
the plaintiff’s. These allegations could be brought by a plaintiff with
an overwhelmingly strong case, or they could be brought by a plaintiff
Two Models, supra note 55. Empirically, this phenomenon manifests itself in
the ever-growing in-house legal departments of large, repeat player defendants.
137 Note that this argument applies only to nuisance suits brought in order to
exploit high litigation costs of the defendant. Parties may bring nuisance litigation for reasons unrelated to the defendant’s litigation costs. For example,
the “fishing expedition” lawsuit seeks not relief for its (pretextual) claims, but
rather to uncover evidence that could justify the bringing of additional (potentially meritorious) lawsuits.
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who is certain to lose—perhaps because other facts (plaintiff’s gross
incompetence, mistreatment of co-workers, etc.) need not have been
included in the complaint. 138
For other types of cases, though, the plausibility requirement may
have teeth. Perhaps elaborate antitrust claims such as Twombly itself
fall into this category. But the hard-to-detect effect of Twombly and
Iqbal on dismissal rates suggests either that these cases are relatively
few—or that courts were dismissing them even before Twombly. As
noted above, Twombly itself was dismissed by the district court. 139 I
now discuss this hypothesis—that plausibility pleading was the norm
long before Twombly.
C. Detailed Pleading from the Judge’s Perspective
So far, I have argued that detailed pleading will arise even in a regime of no pleading standard. The goal of this thought experiment, of
course, is to shed light on actual pleading practice in a world in which
defendants can file motions to dismiss and judges can dismiss cases
for failure to state a claim. I must consider, then, how screening of
case quality by plaintiffs and the use of pleading detail as a signal to
the defendant interact with the third actor in the courtroom: the
judge.
At the end of Part III.B, I began this discussion in the specific context of the nuisance suit. In that context, a plausibility pleading
standard creates an opportunity for a defendant to avoid settling those
nuisance suits for which the plaintiff cannot muster sufficient allegations to survive a motion to dismiss.
Is this a reason to praise Twombly and Iqbal? Perhaps. Much
scholarship takes for granted that plausibility pleading was the product of Twombly and Iqbal. 140 This is surely true as a doctrinal matter.

More generally, some categories of cases may involve “inventory”-type
claims—masses of individual plaintiffs with similar allegations, some of
which are meritorious and any many of which are not. It may be that in some
circumstances, it is more cost effective for a plaintiffs’ attorney simply to file
boilerplate (but plausible) complaints for the entire “inventory” than to engage in screening on merit before the fact. Anecdotally, some types of asbestos litigation have been described this way, as well as certain types of cases
involving relatively small claims for fixed statutory damages, such as under
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
139 See supra at n 96 and accompanying text.
140 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 10; Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide supra note 10,
at 201; J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L.
138
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But as a matter of federal court practice, it may be just as hasty to
praise Twombly and Iqbal for changing litigation outcomes as it is to
lament their doing so. It instead seems that Twombly and Iqbal were
merely an imprimatur by the Supreme Court of the practice of plausibility pleading.
The reason has to do with how the judge responds to the dynamic
of detailed pleading described above. Because of the incentives to
screen and signal case quality, plaintiffs will file detailed factual
pleadings regardless of the pleading standard. Thus, even under Conley, federal court judges saw detailed pleadings in nearly every case.
This not only meant that few complaints would be susceptible to motions to dismiss, 141 but that the few complaints that lacked factual detail appeared exceptional in their lack of detail. While spare allegations were consistent with notice pleading, a judge could infer that the
plaintiff lacked favorable facts to plead and conclude that the case is
exceedingly weak, at least relative to the great mass of cases with detailed pleadings. If so, a judge would be tempted to save the court’s
and the parties’ time and dispose of the case at the outset.
Take a hypothetical district court judge in the pre-Twombly era.
This judge has no particular opinions about pleading standards but
understand that she operates in a liberal, notice pleading regime. The
overwhelming majority of civil complaints that she sees are long—
sometimes tediously so 142—recitations of the facts of the dispute, with
particular emphasis on the facts that tend to prove the plaintiff’s case.
Now imagine a complaint is filed in this judge’s court alleging an
employment discrimination claim that offers nothing more than the
identities of the plaintiff and defendant, the required jurisdictional
allegations, and the following statement:
“I was turned down for a job because of my race.”
When the judge reads this complaint, what will her reaction be?
Probably skepticism. All other plaintiffs in this kind of case—even the
ones who end up losing—provide some indication in their complaints
of why or how the denial of employment was because of race. Perhaps
they describe how they were highly qualified for the job, how their
REV. 1713, 1757 (2012) (“[I]n 2007 the Supreme Court introduced a more rigorous pleading-stage screen: the plausibility standard.”).
141 An empirical regularity, as noted above in Part II.A.
142 See Am. Nurses’ Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The
pleading of facts is well illustrated by the present case. The complaint is
twenty pages long and has a hundred page appendix.”); Decker v. MasseyFerguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1982) (bemoaning the “prolix and
discursive 69 page complaint”).
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employers hired white applicants instead, or how the hired applicants
were less qualified. Perhaps they allege comments about race made by
human resources personnel or provide accounts of other minorities
treated poorly by the defendant. But this plaintiff? Nothing.
Given that this judge lives in a world in which detailed factual
pleading is the norm, she will likely draw a negative inference. Even
plaintiffs with poor cases, the logic goes, can muster some evidence of
discrimination in their complaint. How weak can this case possibly be?
If this plaintiff’s attorney cannot state one fact suggesting race discrimination, the judge might wonder, why is this complaint worth up
to two years of the court’s time? 143
Of course, the judge might not grant a motion to dismiss the complaint. But the judge might. And this is the interesting part, because
“‘I was turned down for a job because of my race’ is all a complaint has
to say” to state a Title VII claim for racial discrimination. 144 A complaint will say much more than it has to say. And if judges see detailed pleading all the time, it is natural that they would come to expect it.
In short, if virtually every plaintiff, even those with relatively
weak cases, has an incentive to plead in detail, judges—even judges
hearing cases under no pleading standard—will (accurately) perceive
factually detailed pleading as the norm. Sparsely pleaded complaints
will appear aberrant and suspect, leading judges to (accurately) infer
that the claims raised by the complaint are likely to be relatively
weak. Given this dynamic, the desire of judges to control their caseloads and weed out weaker cases will create constant pressure to dismiss the rare complaint that gives defendant “notice” of the plaintiff’s
claim but that raises an “implausible” claim.
This expectation of, and demand for, factually detailed pleading is
consistent with the evidence from Conley through Twombly described
above in Part II.D, as well as the tendency, meticulously documented
by Marcus 145 and Fairman, 146 of pleading standards in practice to look
more like fact pleading than notice pleading. 147 As one practitioner

According to my analysis of the administrative data described in Hubbard,
Testing for Change, supra note 32, the median duration for a federal civil case
litigated through trial during the period 2002–2008 was approximately 1
year, 10 months.
144 Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.).
145 Marcus, supra note 4.
146 Fairman, supra note 84.
147 Additionally, scholars such as Bone argued that while Twombly was a
surprise, it was hardly an innovation. See Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note
143
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argued shortly after it was decided, Twombly “is less a sea change as
it is a recognition of what was already going [on] out there in the
trenches.” 148
This leaves only the puzzle of why the Supreme Court bothered to
address pleadings standards when it did—or at all. On this question, I
will offer only conjectures. Perhaps Twombly and Iqbal were simply
“oddball” cases, to use the term coined by Suja Thomas, and the Supreme Court was engaged in rare exercises in error correction. 149 Perhaps they were not about pleading at all; when teaching Civil Procedure, I prompt my students to consider the possibility that Twombly
was simply an antitrust case and Iqbal was a case about respondeat
superior. Perhaps, most simply, they are just a product of the Roberts
Court’s distinctive interest in civil procedure and its efforts to “clean
up doctrinal confusion” in the field. 150
None of this is to claim that judges are dismissing the “right” cases. Indeed, this article makes no claim that judge are or are not
screening out the right cases at the pleading stage. Rather, this article
makes a more fundamental claim: in the mine run of cases, the judges
are not, for better or worse, doing any screening at all. That job is
handled by the plaintiffs’ attorney.

11 and Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to Resist the Urge to
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2010).
148 Andrew Pincus, quoted in Jeff Jeffrey, The Changing World of Civil Procedure Post Twombly, Iqbal, THE BLOG OF THE LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012,
2:42 P.M.), http://legaltimes.typepad.com. Judges have long recognized this
dynamic: “Plaintiffs’ lawyers, knowing that some judges read a complaint as
soon as it is filed in order to get a sense of the suit, hope by pleading facts to
‘educate’ (that is to say, influence) the judge with regard to the nature and
probable merits of the case, and also hope to set the stage for an advantageous settlement by showing the defendant what a powerful case they intend
to prove.” Am. Nurses’ Ass’n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723–724 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.). See also C. Kevin Marshall and Warren Postman, Pleading Facts
and Arguing Plausibility: Federal Pleading Standards a Year After Iqbal,
DAY
PUBLICATIONS
(JUNE
2010)
JONES
http://www.jonesday.com/pleading_facts (noting practice, even before
Twombly, of pleading in detail).
149 Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (2011).
150 I take this view of the Roberts Court, and the quotation, from Howard M.
Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV.
LITIG. 313, 317 (2012), although Wasserman himself does not characterize
Twombly and Iqbal in this way in this article.
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IV. EVERYTHING NEW IS OLD AGAIN
I now return to the empirical puzzles posed at the outset of this article. The theory I present in this article predicts relative constancy in
pleading practice, even as pleading rules or precedents change. In
light of this, the seemingly minimal effects of Twombly and Iqbal become easy to explain. Even under notice pleading, plaintiffs would not
file lawsuits that lacked plausible claims, so introducing an explicit
requirement of plausible factual allegations requires little change in
pleading behavior and precipitates little change in case outcomes.
This logic applies equally to explain the lack of any special effect
on employment discrimination cases and other types of cases that
have been the subject of special concern in the wake of Twombly and
Iqbal. There are, no doubt, plaintiffs who never obtain relief because
they never became aware of the facts, such as the defendant’s discriminatory intent, that establish the strength of their claims. But even in
a world with no pleading standard, such cases would tend not to be
filed, for the simple reason that they are a bad investment. Litigation
is costly. It is simply not worthwhile unless you have a good reason to
think you will win.
Further, the number of motions to dismiss is, and always has been,
relatively modest, and the number of cases dismissed is even smaller.
These facts are a challenge to the view that plausibility pleading
would make motions to dismiss routine. But the infrequency of motions to dismiss is natural consequence of the fact that the vast majority of cases are screened on plausibility before ever being filed. 151 This
is as true today as it was before Twombly—and indeed, as it was before the Federal Rules themselves, as Dean Clark himself observed. 152
Motions to dismiss are only likely in cases where the parties happen to
have very different ideas about what counts as plausibility, or where
one or both of the parties don’t care about plausibility—for example, a
Indeed, the magnitude of case screening by plaintiffs’ attorneys dwarfs the
screening activity of the federal courts. A survey of contingency fee lawyers—
in 1997, long before Twombly, found that “contingency fee lawyers generally
turn down at least as many cases as they accept, and often turn down considerably more than they accept.” Kritzer, supra note 30, at 26.See also id. at 28
(“We might return to Elihu Root’s injunction, ‘about half of the practice of the
decent lawyer consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools
and should stop,’ as one possible measure [of whether attorneys are too litigious]. If we take ‘half of the practice,’ to refer to the proportion of potential
cases accepted, then most contingency fee lawyers achieve this measure of
decency.”).
152 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
151
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plaintiff who files a dubious complaint in the hopes of a nuisance settlement, or a defendant who files a dubious motion to dismiss in the
hopes of intimidating the plaintiff or delaying discovery.
In contrast to the infrequency of motions to dismiss is the frequency with which filed lawsuits are settled shortly after a complaint is
filed. In a recent study, Boyd and Hoffman study litigation activity in
federal civil cases and find that about one-third of filed lawsuits are
settled without any litigation activity occurring—no motions, no discovery. 153 This begs the question, If the parties had no need for motion
practice or discovery to reach settlement, why did the plaintiff bother to
file at all? The answer is that the act of filing a detailed complaint itself promotes settlement. 154
Finally, as noted in Part I, the “Paradox of Pleading” is a popular
argument in favor of notice pleading: “the plausibility inquiry employed by Twombly and Iqbal as a pre-discovery screening device . . .
can thwart meritorious claims by plaintiffs who, without the discovery
process, cannot obtain the information needed to satisfy the plausibility requirement.” 155
Christina L. Boyd and David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, J.
L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming).
154 This is hardly a secret among practitioners. “A well-developed complaint
may force the defendant to confront many questions that will require answers
if it hopes to prevail; the more of these questions that give the defense pause,
the more likely that it will be receptive to considering early settlement discussions or mediation on terms favorable to the plaintiff.” Alan Mansfield,
Factors favoring factually detailed complaints—Securing Early Settlement, 1
BUS & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. §7:33 (Robert L. Haig, ed., 3d ed. 2011).
155 Steinman, supra note 7, at 1311. See also Stancil, supra note 4, at 92 (“An
informational asymmetry favoring defendants over plaintiffs drives a preference for liberal pleading standards. That is, the typical defendant often has
sole possession of relevant information, and plaintiffs often cannot know critical details of their claims before discovery.”); Gordon, supra note 10 (“Where
intent or discriminatory purpose is at issue, the cases present the circular
logic of catch-22. In civil rights claims or motive-based torts—on in claims
where the defendant’s conduct is by nature concealed, like fraud or antitrust—evidence is in the hands of the defense. Discovery remains the only
opportunity to gather this kind of evidence. Yet if a meritorious claim can
never get past the pleading stage, discovery—many claimant’s primary
chance to uncover facts—is not even an option.”); Howard M. Wasserman,
Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 157, 168 (2010) (“[There] is the problem of ‘information asymmetry’ at
the pleading stage. This is a common structural feature of modern federal
litigation, particularly civil rights, where key relevant information is uniquely in defendants’ hands, unknown to the plaintiff at the time of pleading and
unknowable without opportunity for discovery. . . . And if the complaint can153
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Further, this concern appears to have particular traction in civil
rights, and specifically employment discrimination, cases. 156 Perhaps
because Conley and Iqbal were civil rights cases, this paradox is taken
as uncontroversial. 157 But the discussion above should make clear that
this “paradox” is more myth than reality.
The paradox begins with a plaintiff who believes she has a meritorious case but who is unable to plead facts establishing the plausibility
of her case. This scenario begs the question of how it is that the plaintiff has formed her belief of the merit of her grievance. This belief
must come from something that the plaintiff, or someone known to the
plaintiff, saw, heard, or experienced—in other words, out of facts. But
if so, then all the plaintiff needs to do is plead those facts that led her
to conclude that her claim was meritorious. The only paradox here is
why someone with no facts indicating that they have a claim would
nonetheless believe they have a claim.
Of course, there are surely some potential plaintiffs who have been
injured by the wrongdoing of a potential defendant, but who have no
facts suggesting this to them. The problem is that neither we nor they
can distinguish them from everyone else—those who have not been
injured by the wrongdoing of a potential defendant, and who (like the
first group) have no facts suggesting that they have been wronged.
In short, a plaintiff with no specific facts tending to show that she
has a claim will rarely file a lawsuit, regardless of the pleading standard. The reason, as noted above, is that such a lawsuit is not worth
bringing. Importantly, this result is inevitable under any pleading regime. The practice of plausibility pleading is the outcome of the strategic interactions of plaintiffs and defendants and their attorneys, for
whom pleading serves as a mechanism for credible communication
not survive—a more likely result under a stricter pleading regime—the plaintiff never will have an opportunity to truly test the merits of the claim.”). See
also Spencer Plausibility, supra note 7, at 488; Miller, supra note 10, at 45,
105; Steinman, supra note 7, at 1311 n. 116 (citing additional sources); Martin H. Redish and Lee Epstein, Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly and the Future
of Pleading in Federal Courts: A Normative and Empirical Analysis 2
(Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Paper No.
10–16, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581481; Hoffman, supra
note 10, at 1261.
156 See supra nn. 19–20 and accompanying text.
157 Indeed, Miller notes, “The problem was widely recognized at the Duke
Conference [on civil litigation, May 10–11, 2010, sponsored by the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference] and no opposition was voiced
to the need for solving the information-asymmetry problem.” Miller, supra
note 10,at 105 n. 404.
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and a catalyst for settlement. Twombly and Iqbal regularized formal
doctrine, but did not revolutionize practice.
This raises a broader question: to what extent is the Supreme
Court a lagging, rather than leading, indicator of changes in civil procedure and practice? Hillel Levin has noted that this is not the first
time a landmark Supreme Court decision on procedure ultimately
proved to be little more than a confirmation of existing practice. 158 For
more than a decade after the Celotex trilogy was decided in 1986, 159 a
steady stream of papers argued that these cases had brought about
the end of the jury trial. But empirical studies found that summary
judgment rates rose, and trial rates fell, years before the Celotex trilogy, and in fact those rates were basically flat throughout the 1980s. 160
V. CONCLUSION: THE “LIBERAL ETHOS” IN MODERN PRACTICE
In presenting its account of plausibility pleading, the objectives of
this paper have been essentially descriptive, rather than normative.
But if plausibility pleading is—and has long been—the norm, one
might ask whether this stands in tension with the purposes of pleading under the Federal Rules and the “liberal ethos” that the Federal
Rules introduced in 1938. As Marcus put it, “Dean Clark and the other
drafters of the Federal Rules set out to devise a procedural system
that would install what may be labelled the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which
the preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery.” 161
Spencer has captured a widespread sentiment in arguing that with
Twombly and Iqbal the courts have rejected the “liberal ethos” of civil
procedure in favor of what he calls the “restrictive ethos” in civil procedure. 162 The restrictive ethos is “characterized by a desire to disSee Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143 (2010).
159 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
160 See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practices
in Six Federal District Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861 (2007); STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, (2004).
161 Marcus, supra note 4, at 439. See also Spencer, Restrictive Ethos, supra
note 21, at 355–56 (footnotes omitted) (“Simplified pleading and broad discovery were designed to promote resolution of disputes on the substantive
merits as opposed to procedural technicalities.”).
162 Spencer, Restrictive Ethos, supra note 21, at 353.
158
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courage certain claims and to keep systemic litigation costs under control.” 163 This “restrictive ethos . . . frustrates the ability of claimants to
prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal
court.” 164
While the merely descriptive account presented in this paper does
not establish any definitive normative claims about plausibility pleading, it does suggest that a juxtaposition of “liberal” notice pleading and
“restrictive” plausibility pleading may be more apparent than real.
Rather, I would claim that plausibility pleading serves the same ends
today that notice pleading sought to serve in 1938. 165
Of course, Twombly and Iqbal certainly do not promote the resolution of disputes by jury trial, or after discovery. Quite the opposite,
they seem to prefer disposition at the pleading stage, before discovery.
But any conclusion as to the demise of the liberal ethos and the rise of
the restrictive ethos would be doubly overstated. Judged by the standard of “disposition . . . on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure
through discovery,” 166 the liberal ethos has never taken hold; jury trials comprise about 2 percent of all federal court civil dispositions, and
did so long before Twombly. 167 But neither has the restrictive ethos
taken hold; both before and after Twombly and Iqbal, granted motions
to dismiss comprise an equally small share of federal court civil dispositions. 168
The empirical infrequency of both jury trials and dismissals for
failure to state a claim is a sign that our usual conception of the liberal ethos relies on a dichotomy—between resolution on the merits at
trial and resolution due to technical defects in the pleadings—that no
longer exists. This dichotomy existed under common law pleading, and
was justifiably a concern of Dean Clark and the drafters of the Federal
Rules. But it is irrelevant today. Instead, both resolution at trial and
resolution on the pleadings are unusual outcomes in modern litiga-

Id. at 366.
Id. at 353–54.
165 In a closely related vein, Bone has argued at length that the vision of the
drafters of the Federal Rules was a pragmatic one, and that Twombly reflects
a pragmatic approach to pleading. See Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 11,
at 890–98.
166 Marcus, supra note 4 at 439 (emphasis added).
167 Analysis of the administrative data described in Hubbard, Testing for
Change, supra note 32, during the period 2002–2008.
168 See Figure 1 and accompanying text.
163
164
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tion. The real endgame is settlement, 169 and the liberal ethos of the
Federal Rules needs to be understood in this light. 170
How does one translate the “liberal ethos” into a world of settlement? By recognizing that the critical distinction is not between pleading and trial, but between the resolution of litigation as “a game of
skill” versus “on the merits.” 171 With common law pleading long buried, however, the “game of skill” that should attract our attention is
not exploitation of the traps and technicalities of pleading, but rather
the strategic use of discovery costs to obtain settlements unjustified by
the merits of the claim.
Viewed in this light, plausibility pleading does not represent a departure from the liberal ethos. 172 The whole point of the plausibility
standard is that the court is judging the merits of the complaint. 173
Twombly’s concern was a case that would settle not because it had
merit, but because the costs of discovery were so large and so asymmetrically burdensome to the defendant. Dismissing such a case on
the merits is preferable to having such a case settle not on the merits.
Of course, because the true merit of a case is unobservable, any
system that dismisses some cases at the pleadings stage runs the risk
of dismissing a case that, had it not been dismissed, would have settled on the merits. It is this trade-off between the benefits of preventing settlements not on the merits and the costs of preventing settle-

For a broader discussion of the ways that settlement interacts with the
Federal Rules, see Glover, supra note 137 ).
170 Indeed, a feature of the informal models I describe in this paper is that all
of the litigation strategy and pleading behavior is driven by litigation costs
and the desire for settlement—neither the legal rules of pleading nor trial per
se play a role in the analysis.
171 These quotes are from Conley. “The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to
the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48
(1957).
172 See also Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 11, at 890–898.
173 Richard Marcus made this point long before Twombly: “Under the received
tradition, the problem with common law pleading practice was that, while it
led to actual decisions, it often did not lead to merits decisions because cases
were frequently resolved on technicalities. The notice pleading scenario, by
way of contrast, eliminates the possibility for even genuine merits decisions
at the pleadings stage. The middle ground is to use pleadings practice to
make genuine and reliable merits decisions. Contrary to expectation, this activity is not dead, though it is often camouflaged in notice pleadings language.” Marcus, supra note 4, at 454.
169
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ments on the merits that is, or at least should be, the central issue in
the debate on the wisdom of Twombly and Iqbal.
The non-effect of Twombly and Iqbal as an empirical matter, however, provides some comfort here. If Twombly and Iqbal are requiring
courts to screen out cases that would not have been dismissed before,
it is a small set of cases. 174 And even the de facto regime of plausibility
pleading that I argue existed before Twombly involved a tiny number
of dismissals, precisely because most low-merit cases were screened
out by plaintiffs’ attorneys before ever becoming lawsuits. The model
described in Part III.B does identify one category of litigation in which
plausibility pleading leads to different outcomes than no pleading
standard: cases of extremely low merit that have settlement value because of the defendant’s litigation costs. In these cases, complaints
will contain detailed factual allegations (to credibly show the defendant that the plaintiff has front-loaded her discovery costs) but despite
their detail, the allegations will not state a plausible claim (because
the claim is, by assumption, very low merit). For these cases, plausibility pleading makes a difference relative to no pleading standard.
Further, while such cases are likely a small set of all filed cases,
they may have a disproportionate impact on federal civil litigation as
a whole. 175 The best available evidence on the costs of litigation indicate that even a tiny fraction of cases has the potential to impose large
burdens on the federal courts and the civil justice system in general.
My analysis of data from a recent FJC survey reveals that litigation
costs are quite low in most cases—but a small fraction of cases are extraordinarily expensive: 5 percent of cases account for about 60 percent of litigation costs. 176
As Suja Thomas has argued, Twombly and Iqbal were “oddball” cases—
cases that involved unusual allegations and were unrepresentative of most
litigation. Thomas, supra note 144, at 215. Perhaps, rather than have a broad
effect, they will impact similar, “oddball” cases.
175 Twombly and Iqbal have been criticized on the ground that “[a]lthough
discovery can be enormously expensive in a small percentage of federal cases,
Twombly and Iqbal have stated a pleading rule that burdens all cases based
on what may be happening in a small fraction of them.” Miller, supra note 10,
at 64. As this paper attempts to show, Twombly and Iqbal have not burdened
“all cases”; they have had no effect on most cases. The only question is
whether they are doing any good with respect to the “small fraction.”
176 See WILLIAM H.J. HUBBARD, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE PRESERVATION
COSTS SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES (Sept. 8, 2011) (available online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf_E
mpirical_Data/Civil%20Justice%20Reform%20Group.pdf), (Report submitted
to Discovery Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules) (using
data reported in LEE & WILLGING, supra note 106).
174
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What complicates this analysis is the fact that cases “with merit”
and cases “with large and asymmetrical discovery costs” are not exclusive categories. A case can be both. 177 How to deal with litigation that
is driven both by (plausible) merit and asymmetric litigation costs remains a critical policy question for civil procedure. Twombly and Iqbal
direct our attention to this question, but hardly resolve it.

As Spencer notes, “discovery abuse in the form of impositional requests is
not an evil unique to groundless or insufficiently pleaded claims. Such abuse
can occur regardless of whether the underlying claims are legitimate or meritless, well-pleaded or not.” Spencer, Plausibility, supra note 7, at 452. See
also Marcus, supra note 4, at 479 (noting, “The problem is identifying a strike
suit. . . . [T]here is no intrinsic relation between litigation expense or other
disagreeable side effects of a lawsuit and the absence of merit in a plaintiff’s
case.”).
177
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